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Standard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac-
count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ-
ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent employment measured
in Europe. This paper shows that a matching model in which ￿rms use temporary
contracts to screen workers for permanent positions can successfully ful￿ll this
task. When the model is calibrated to the Italian economy, it accounts for salient
statistics including the worker turnover rate, the transition rates into permanent
employment, and the drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms im-
plemented in the late 1990s. When temporary contracts are used as a screening
device, they can increase both productivity and welfare. Their quantitative impact
crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages.
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Labor market rigidities are believed to be at the heart of the surge and per-
sistence in European unemployment after the mid 1970s. To date, the major policy
response to high unemployment rates has been the reduction of employment protection
for new hires through the liberalization of temporary contracts. However, theoretical
models investigating temporary contracts are either inconclusive about the e⁄ects on
employment and unemployment, or predict an increase in the unemployment rate.
Furthermore, several studies have also pointed out that two-tier labor market reforms
are likely to create segmented labor markets, in which part of the workers are trapped
in low-paid, low-productivity temporary jobs, with little prospect of upward mobility.
These predictions are in con￿ ict with recent empirical evidence showing that, in Eu-
rope, temporary contracts correlate positively with employment rates, and temporary
workers enjoy considerably high rates of transition into permanent employment.
This paper presents an equilibrium model of the labor market which is able to ac-
count for this empirical evidence. Furthermore, it provides a useful framework which
is suited to address most of the questions raised in the literature, that is, how tem-
porary contracts interact with other labor market institutions, and how they a⁄ect
productivity, hiring practices, turnover rates, wage di⁄erentials, career prospects and
welfare. The central assumption is that ￿rms use temporary contracts to screen work-
ers for permanent positions. As I show in the paper, this hypothesis has been recently
supported by a large amount of empirical evidence.
The model extends the matching framework of Pries and Rogerson (2005) by intro-
ducing the possibility for the ￿rms to o⁄er both temporary and permanent contracts.
In particular, it is assumed that ￿rms can o⁄er a temporary contract with an exoge-
nous probability, which depends on the strictness of labor market regulations. It is
further assumed that the two contracts di⁄er only in the associated dismissal costs.
With Pries and Rogerson (2005), the model shares the assumption that workers are
both an inspection good and an experience good. At the time of matching, both the
employer and the worker receive a signal over the true quality of the match. A match
is formed only if this signal exceeds a certain threshold. If the match is formed, both
parties learn about the true quality of the match over time. A temporary match which
turns out to be good is upgraded to a permanent position, while a match which turns
out to be unsuitable is destroyed. The main mechanism of the model, which drives all
welfare gains, is very simple and can be summarized as follows. In a framework where
most of the separations at short tenure are driven by learning about match quality,
temporary contracts increase the value of posting vacancies since they allow workers
to be screened on the job without incurring any cost if a bad match is terminated.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a model which, embedding the
screening hypothesis, can account both for the transition rates observed in most Eu-
ropean countries and for the evidence that temporary contracts correlate positively
with the employment rate. The model also o⁄ers a new explanation for the existence
of wage di⁄erentials between temporary and permanent workers. Since the ￿rm does
not face dismissal costs if a temporary worker is ￿red, the threshold signal required to
1hire a worker is lower for temporary positions. Temporary workers are therefore less
productive and earn lower wages. Besides explaining wage di⁄erentials, the dynamic
properties of the model are also consistent with the ￿nding that workers starting their
career in temporary positions are expected to catch up over time with the wages of
workers starting in permanent positions. Another important contribution of this pa-
per is that it o⁄ers a rationale for the ￿nding that temporary contracts seem to act
as an important screening device in European countries but not in the US. In Europe,
where it is expensive to destroy a permanent position, temporary contracts increase
the expected pro￿ts of a vacancy by allowing ￿rms to screen new hires on the job at
no cost; in an economy -the US- with no ￿ring restrictions, on the other hand both
types of contracts are equivalent and there is no reason to resort to temporary con-
tracts to screen workers. In general, the model shows that temporary contracts can
reverse most of the negative e⁄ects associated with permanent-employment protection
and with its interactions with minimum wages. Overall it is found that temporary
contracts increase the worker turnover rate, the average quality of the matches and
welfare. For each of these results, I will elaborate on the intuition below.
The model is calibrated to the Italian economy. Italy is a sensible choice to judge
the performance of the model for a number of reasons. First, Italy is the OECD country
with the lowest probation period on permanent positions. Second, Italy ranks second
in terms of the OECD (1999) employment protection index and undertook major lib-
eralizations of temporary contracts in the last ten years. For these reasons, Italy is the
country where the gains from screening through temporary contracts are expected to
be the largest, and o⁄ers the best available laboratory to test the screening hypothesis.
When the model is calibrated with parameter values re￿ ecting labor market institu-
tions in Italy, the simulated economy can account for the transition probabilities from
temporary to permanent positions, the worker turnover rate and the existence of a
wage gap between temporary and permanent workers. Furthermore, a simple exercise
of comparative statics can quantitatively replicate the behavior of the unemployment
rate in Italy in the last ten years.
The paper is organized as follows: the next Section relates the paper to the lit-
erature, while Section 3 discusses some stylized facts. Section 4 presents the model.
Section 5 calibrates the model and presents the quantitative analysis. The results are
discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
This paper brings together the investigations initiated by Pries (2004) on how
learning about match quality a⁄ects separations in the labor market and the vast
literature that analyzes the macroeconomic e⁄ects of temporary contracts. Most of
the existing models in this ￿eld embed the mainstream view that temporary contracts
are an instrument which o⁄ers more ￿ exibility to the ￿rms to adjust employment
faced with changing business cycle conditions or idiosyncratic demand shocks. This
perspective has always been well rooted among both academics and policy-makers, as
2historically, the main reason temporary contracts were introduced into Europe was the
idea that higher labor market ￿ exibility would permanently decrease unemployment.
Most studies in this literature have analyzed the impact of temporary contracts
within the traditional partial equilibrium framework of labor demand under uncer-
tainty, pioneered by Nickell (1986), and extensively analyzed by Bentolila and Bertola
(1990) and Bertola (1990). In this class of models the ￿rm has a stable permanent
workforce, and adjusts the stock of temporary workers to ￿ uctuations in economic ac-
tivity (Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1992; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). The main reason
￿rms use temporary contracts, in these frameworks, is therefore to maintain a bu⁄er
stock of workers who can be readily dismissed when there is a need to adjust to eco-
nomic downturns. Typically, in these models workers are segregated according to their
employment contract and enjoy no upward mobility. The most important contribution
that these papers have made in the literature is to show that higher turnover and
higher volatility over the business cycle is as much as one could reasonably expect
from the very much advocated ￿ exibility in the labor market. In an application to the
Swedish labor market, Holmund and Storrie (2002) ￿nd evidence of temporary em-
ployment being more volatile. While this class of models is typically inconclusive on
the long-term impact on employment and unemployment rates, Alonso-Borrego et al.
(2005) present a general equilibrium model following the same perspective and show
that when it is calibrated, unemployment should unambiguously increase following the
liberalizations of TC.
Another important contribution in the literature is the paper by Blanchard and
Landier (2002). They take a di⁄erent angle on the analysis of temporary contracts, and
show that besides failing to reduce unemployment, TC might also create segmented
labor markets with low transition into permanent employment. The main idea is that
due to the existence of non-renewal clauses, if ￿ring costs on permanent positions are
high compared to search costs, when a temporary contract expires a ￿rm is better o⁄
not renewing the contract, even if the temporary match was of relatively high quality.
In this case, high turnover on temporary positions becomes part of the ￿rm￿ s person-
nel policies. In other words, temporary contracts are mainly used as instruments of
churning policies, implying that workers may go through di⁄erent spells of unemploy-
ment before ￿nding a permanent job. As a result, transition rates into permanent
employment are low. Under this scenario, two-tier reforms of the labor market de-
crease welfare, and most likely increase the unemployment rate at the steady state.
Similar conclusions have been reached by Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002).
Both the bu⁄er stock and the churning hypotheses have cast serious doubts on the
gains that can be obtained through the liberalization of temporary contracts. However,
both perspectives lead to predictions which are, to some extent, counterfactual. The
fact that most OECD countries are characterized by massive yearly ￿ ows from tempo-
rary to permanent employment, that temporary workers enjoy substantial continuity
in employment, and that temporary contracts are found to correlate positively with
employment rates within European countries, cannot be accounted for within these
frameworks of analysis. I will discuss these ￿ndings in more detail in the following
section. Furthermore, a growing body of empirical evidence in recent years, based on
3the observation of most European countries, has suggested that there might be another
important reason behind the use of TC whose implications are still relatively unex-
plored in macro theory. There is now substantial evidence supporting the hypothesis
that ￿rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions.
There are a series of papers, as surveyed by Ichino et al. (2008), showing that being
assigned to a temporary position has a large causal e⁄ect on the probability of ￿nding
a permanent match. The bottomline of this empirical literature is that temporary con-
tracts are stepping stones into permanent employment rather than dead-end jobs, and
has been interpreted as evidence in favour of the screening hypothesis. While these
results are robust across European countries1, they are in contrast with those found for
the US (Autor and Houseman, 2005). Furthermore, a recent paper by Nunziata and
Sta⁄olani (2007) using data on the 15 major European countries, shows that measures
of temporary-employment protection are negatively correlated with the rate of em-
ployment in permanent positions. This ￿nding has also been interpreted as evidence
in favour of the screening hypothesis. Finally, Varejao and Portugal (2003), using data
on the Portuguese labor market, show that "screening workers for permanent positions
is the single most important reason why ￿rms use these types of contracts". This pa-
per embeds the screening hypothesis documented by these studies into an equilibrium
model of the labor market.
To sum up, the literature has identi￿ed the following three main reasons for the
use of temporary contracts:
1. as a bu⁄er stock against downturns in economic activity;
2. as instruments of churning policies;
3. as a screening device.
While the macroeconomic e⁄ects of temporary contracts under the ￿rst two hy-
potheses have received a great deal of attention in the literature, the implications of
temporary contracts as a screening device have sofar been analyzed only by Nagypal
(2002). With respect to her contribution, this paper shares the result that as ex-
perimentation in the economy increases with the use of temporary contracts, so does
the productivity of the workers and welfare. However, this paper di⁄ers in several
ways from Nagypal￿ s (2002). First, it uses a simpler process to describe the process of
learning about match quality, and abstracts from learning-by-doing. Second, the as-
sumptions of an all-or-nothing learning process together with the use of hiring practices
produces a di⁄erent mechanism through which ￿ring costs a⁄ect the equilibrium and
reverse her ￿ndings that temporary contracts increase the unemployment rate. Third,
this paper calibrates the model on the Italian labor market. Finally, this paper di⁄ers
in the scope of the analysis, investigating the interactions of temporary contracts with
1Among other European countries, evidence in this direction is available for Italy (Adam and
Canziani, 1998 and Ichino et al., 2005), for the United Kingdom (Booth et al. 2002), for Germany
and the Netherlands (Lechner et al. 2000; Dekker, 2001; Zijl et al., 2004), and for Sweden (Holmund
and Storrie, 2002).
4other labor market institutions, the transition rates implied by the model, and the
impact on hiring practices, turnover rates and wage di⁄erentials.
This paper is also directly related to the work of Pries (2004), who estimates for
the US labor market the process of learning about match quality. Pries (2004) shows
that the estimated process of learning by matching the high rates of job destruction
at short tenures, is key to reconciling the remarkable persistence of the unemployment
rate over the business cycle with the high job ￿nding rate measured in the data. Pries
and Rogerson (2005) exploit the process of learning about match quality estimated
by Pries (2004) to build up a model which is able to explain di⁄erences in turnover
rates between Europe and the US. In this paper, I investigate how the process of
learning about match quality estimated by Pries (2004) can contribute to improving
our understanding of the macroeconomic implications of temporary contracts.
3 Stylized facts
3.1 Stylized facts for European countries
This section highlights some important stylized facts accounted for by the model,
which refer to cross-sectional studies on European countries.
As reported by the OECD (2002), for most European countries workers employed
on a temporary contract in 1996 had at least a probability of about 40% to be em-
ployed in a permanent position one year later2. In other words, close to half of the
total stock of temporary workers moves into permanent employment within a year
of time. Further more, quoting the OECD (2002), p.131, "the evidence for European
countries suggests that the majority of temporary workers have considerable continuity
in employment: being in employment one year earlier and remaining in employment
one and two years later". These statistics reveal that most European countries are
characterized by massive yearly ￿ ows from temporary to permanent employment and
by substantial continuity in employment, suggesting that only a relatively small frac-
tion of the workforce might be trapped into recurring spells of temporary employment
and unemployment. This considerable degree of upward mobility and integration in
the labor markets is di¢ cult to reconcile with the idea that temporary contracts are
used as instruments of churning policies. The yearly transition probabilities among
European countries range between 36% and 56% with only two notable exceptions,
Spain and France. In these countries a worker on a temporary contract had in 1996
only about a 20% chance of being in a permanent contract one year later. Only in
these two countries have the reforms created a rather segmented labor market with
low mobility from temporary to permanent employment, suggesting that alternative
forces leading to market segmentation and churning could be dominant. I therefore
summarize the ￿rst stylized fact as follows:
2The OECD (2002) computes transition probabilities across the states of unemployment, tempo-
rary employment and permanent employment. They restrict the sample to the individuals beginning
in dependent employment or unemployment in 1996 and moving neither in self-employment nor in
inactivity during 1997-98. This makes their statistics directly comparable to our model.
5Stylized Fact 1: European countries appear to be characterized by high rates of
transition into permanent employment.
While there has been considerable empirical literature focusing on ￿ring costs and
severance payments, little empirical work has investigated the e⁄ects of temporary con-
tracts on employment and unemployment. A recent paper by Nunziata and Sta⁄olani
(2007) provides the most careful multi-country analysis aiming to identify the correla-
tions between employment rates and a set of employment regulation reforms, including
two-tier reforms, implemented over the period 1983-1999 in 15 European countries.
The regression analysis controls for a large set of institutions, which include union
density, bargaining coordination, the tax wedge, and unemployment bene￿ts, and for
interaction e⁄ects between these institutions. Importantly, following Nickell et al.
(2005), the regressions also control for a number of factors that can in￿ uence employ-
ment and unemployment rates in the short run. These control variables include labor
demand shocks, long-term interest rates, acceleration in money supply, and terms of
trade shocks. The authors ￿nd that looser regulations on ￿xed-term contracts and
lower dismissal costs on permanent positions are signi￿cantly correlated with an in-
crease in the employment rate. In particular, ￿xed-term contracts, which constitute
the bulk of all types of temporary contracts, seem to be associated with increases in
the employment rate in permanent positions, and this has been interpreted as sugges-
tive evidence in favor of the screening hypothesis. These results are robust to various
changes in the econometric speci￿cation. Previous studies focusing on broad indicators
of employment protection have often found positive correlations with the unemploy-
ment rate, although this result is not always signi￿cant across studies (Howell et al.,
2007). I summarize these ￿ndings as follows:
Stylized Fact 2: Fixed-term contracts are found to correlate positively with the em-
ployment rate at the European level.
Another important ￿nding in the literature of temporary contracts, which has
prompted research in the ￿eld, is the existence of wage di⁄erentials between tempo-
rary and permanent workers. The OECD (2002) reports evidence of wage penalties
associated with temporary contracts for all European countries. The average wage
gap ranges from 17% in Germany, to 47% in Spain. Controlling for worker and job
characteristics, the average wage penalty for the countries surveyed by the European
Commission Household Panel is 15%, and ranges from 7% in Austria to 24% in the
Netherlands. Findings on the wage penalties for temporary workers have been re-
ported also by Booth et al. (2002) for Britain, by Dekker (2002) for the Netherlands,
Germany and the United Kingdom, by Blanchard and Landier (2002) for France and
by Houseman (1997) for the US. I summarize these ￿ndings as follows:
Stylized Fact 3: Controlling for worker and job characteristics, workers on tempo-
rary contracts are paid less than workers on permanent contracts.
6There are a couple of papers in the literature which provide an explanation for the
existence of wage di⁄erentials. G￿ell (2005) presents a theory based on an e¢ ciency
wage perspective. The basic idea is that ￿rms do not need to o⁄er an e¢ ciency premium
in order to provide workers with non-shirking incentives, since the possibility of non-
renewal for temporary contracts can achieve the same results. Alternatively, Bentolila
and Dolado (1994) suggest that if unions are dominated by permanent workers subject
to ￿ring restrictions, the existence of a bu⁄er stock of temporary workers might increase
their bargaining power and their wages. This paper o⁄ers a di⁄erent explanation for
the existence of wage di⁄erentials. Since ￿rms that o⁄er a temporary contract incur no
dismissal costs, should the match turn out to be of low quality, ￿rms have an incentive
to use less selective hiring practices. Therefore, temporary workers are paid less simply
because they are less productive.
3.2 The case of Italy
In the model, learning that a match is bad entails costs of dismissal that are to be
paid only on permanent positions, not on temporary positions. However, it is known
that in the real world, no dismissal costs are to be paid if a worker employed on a
permanent position is ￿red during the probationary period. This trial period, which
follows the beginning of a new relationship, usually ranges in Europe between three
and six months. Therefore, from the perspective of this paper, there are gains to be
obtained from temporary contracts so long as it takes more than three or six months
to discover the true productivity of a worker. The shorter the period of probation, the
larger the gains expected from screening workers through temporary contracts.
Italy is the OECD country with the lowest probationary period and with the sec-
ond highest index of employment protection. In Italy, the common length for trial
periods, as established in the enforceable collective agreements, ranges between one
and two weeks for blue collar workers and between three to eight weeks for white
collar workers (OECD 1999, p.103). Italy is therefore the country where the e⁄ects
produced by temporary contracts through the screening channel are expected to show
up most clearly in the data. Furthermore, in the last ten years, major liberalizations
of temporary contracts have been implemented.
In Italy, the ￿rst important wave of reforms of temporary contracts took place in
1997. As discussed by Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), the adoption of temporary contracts
had already been partially liberalized in 1984 and 1987, but unions were given the
power to hinder their di⁄usion. Only when this obstacle was ￿nally removed in 1997,
could the use of temporary contracts be adopted. A second wave of reforms, in 2003,
further enhanced access to temporary contracts. The picture in the Appendix describes
the behavior of the labor market, in terms of both the share of temporary contracts
and the quarterly unemployment rate, between 1996 and 2007. Both 1996 and 2007
were periods of expansionary economic activity, and re￿ ect comparable business cycle
conditions.
What emerges is a clear-cut negative association between temporary contracts and
the unemployment rate. In the ten years following the beginning of the reforms, the
7share of temporary contracts almost doubled, increasing from 7.5% to 13%, while
the unemployment rate halved, dropping from 11.3% in 1997 to 5.7% in the second
quarter of 2007, which is below the European average. Furthermore, the quarterly
unemployment rate steadily decreased also during the downturns of economic activity
early after the turn of the century. This decrease in the unemployment rate was
mirrored by an increase in the employment rate, from 60.2% in 1996 to 65.9% in
2006. This increase in the employment rate is, to some extent, a phenomenon that
has characterized other European labor markets in the last ten years. However, the
magnitude of the phenomenon in Italy largely outweighs the European experience.
Moreover, in the last ten years Italy has been among the countries in Europe with
the highest employment content of growth, exceeding by far the average European
performance. The participation rate also increased over the period, from 59% in 1996
to 63% in 20063. However, it is di¢ cult to tell what impact this increase has had
on the unemployment rate. To the extent that the increase in the participation rate
re￿ ects the regularization of immigrant workers or, more generally, an emerging hidden
economy, this increase should reduce the unemployment rate. To the extent that it
re￿ ects an increase in the number of job seekers, attracted by the existence of new
contractual arrangements, the increase in the participation rate should increase the
unemployment rate. Both phenomena have certainly been relevant in the last decade.
The picture that arises is therefore one of a permanent decrease in the long-run
unemployment rate. The thesis put forward in this paper is that the drop in the unem-
ployment rate was mainly produced by the liberalization of temporary contracts, which
was, undoubtedly, the major labor market reform of the last decade. Furthermore, the
impact on unemployment and employment rates might have been more apparent in
Italy than in other European countries because of the unique combination of high
employment protection and low probationary period. Up to date, very few models
in this literature are calibrated, and none can qualitatively account for a decrease in
the unemployment rate. Section 5 shows that when our model is calibrated to re￿ ect
labor market institutions in Italy, it is able to qualitatively and quantitatively account




This section presents a matching model of the labor market that builds on Pries
and Rogerson (2005).
The matching technology:
There is a frictional labor market and a unit mass of workers who can be either
employed or unemployed. On-the-job search is ruled out so that workers can only
3The statistics in this paragraph have been reported by the Italian national institute of statistics,
Istat (2006).
8search for a job if unemployed. Firms must post a vacancy to ￿ll a job, and the cost
of keeping a vacancy open per period is denoted by c. The measure of vacancies and
unemployed workers at time ￿ is denoted by v￿ and u￿. A standard constant-returns-
to-scale matching technology, M(v￿;u￿), determines the number of job matches per
unit of time as a function of vacancies and unemployed workers. Every period, a
vacancy meets a worker with probability M(v￿;u￿)=v￿ = M(1;u￿=v￿) = m(￿￿), where
￿￿ = v￿=u￿ denotes labor market tightness. Similarly, a worker meets a ￿rm with
probability M(v￿;u￿)=u￿ = ￿￿m(￿￿): It is assumed that m(￿￿) ! 1 and ￿￿m(￿￿) ! 0
as ￿￿ ! 0, and m(￿￿) ! 0 and ￿￿m(￿￿) ! 1 as ￿￿ ! 1:
Production technology and learning about match quality:
The production technology and the process of learning about match quality are
identical to Pries (2004), and Pries and Rogerson (2005). A unit of production is a
matched worker-￿rm pair. All workers are ex-ante identical, but ex-post di⁄erent, since
productivity is match-speci￿c. The output of a match at any time ￿ is only observed
at the end of the period; and is given by y￿ = ￿ y + ￿￿, where ￿￿ is a mean zero random
variable, uniformly distributed over the domain [￿z;z]. ￿ y denotes the true quality of
a match, which can either be good or bad: if good ￿ y = yg, while if bad ￿ y = yb: When
a worker and a ￿rm meet, the true productivity of the match is unknown both to the
worker and to the ￿rm, but they both observe the realization of a signal ￿, which
denotes the probability that the match turns out to be good. Any draw of ￿ is taken
from a cumulative distribution H(￿) and is independent across matches. The hiring
decision takes place at the beginning of the period, and is based only on the realization
of this signal.
If a match is formed, each period the unit of production will try to infer the true
quality of the match by observing realized output. Whenever production falls in the
range of y￿ 2 (yb + z;yg + z], the worker and ￿rm pair learn that the match is good,
since a low type worker is not able to produce such a high level of output. Similarly,
if output falls in the range of y￿ 2 [yb ￿ z;yg ￿ z) the match is revealed to be of low
quality, since none of such realizations is compatible with a high type worker. With
probability denoted by ￿ = (yg ￿ yb)=2z, the true quality of the match is therefore
discovered. With the complement probability 1 ￿ ￿ nothing is learned since, due to
the assumption of a uniformly distributed noise term, the posterior probability equals
the prior. The process of learning about match-speci￿c productivity therefore takes
an "all-or-nothing" form. Since I am only interested in characterizing the stationary







Figure1: Learning about match quality
9Contracts:
There are two types of contracts in the economy: temporary contracts and perma-
nent contracts. The existence of a dismissal cost d > 0; which is speci￿c for permanent
positions, is the only di⁄erence between the two contracts. The productivity of a
match is therefore independent of the contract, and remains unchanged throughout
the duration of the relationship, unless an exogenous shock of job destruction denoted
by ￿; and identical across contracts, renders the match unproductive. Every period,
a relationship ends either if the quality of the match is discovered to be bad, or if an
exogenous shock renders the match unproductive.
The model is built to embed the hypothesis that ￿rms screen suitable workers for
permanent positions. If a worker is hired on a temporary basis, the contract is then
maintained until the true productivity of the match is revealed. At that time, it is
assumed that the contract is either transformed into a permanent one, if the match
turns out to be good, or the relationship is severed at no cost, if the match turns out
to be bad.4 If instead the worker is hired on a permanent contract, the relationship
is severed whenever the match is discovered to be bad, at the cost d. Temporary
contracts then allow employers to save on the dismissal costs which would otherwise
be paid if bad workers were hired on permanent contracts. Therefore, ￿rms always
prefer to hire on temporary positions. Yet, it is assumed that the ￿rm is allowed to
o⁄er a temporary contract only with probability ￿: This parameter thus represents the
strictness of the regulation on temporary contracts. Labor market reforms enhancing
access to temporary contracts can therefore be represented by an increase in ￿.5
Wages:
There is an exogenous minimum wage in the economy, which is denoted by ￿ !:
Wages are negotiated at the beginning of each period and cannot be conditional on
4Endogenizing the decision to upgrade temporary contracts into permanent contracts is beyond the
scope of this paper. The most cited reason for the conversion of a temporary contract is the existence of
non-renewal clauses. Usually, among European countries temporary contracts are no longer renewable
after two or three years. Given the learning process estimated by Pries (2004), and embedded in this
model, by the end of two years of tenure, virtually all of the matches would be classi￿ed as good or
bad. At that time, all good matches and only the good matches would be upgraded into permanent
positions. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I do not explicitly model an up-or-out
clause, and assume that temporary matches are upgraded as soon as they are discovered to be good.
It is important to notice that this simpli￿cation, which implies perfect screening ability, does not bias
the selection of good matches into permanent positions. Furthermore, G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007)
￿nd that in Spain, most conversions into permanent employment take place before the end of their
legal duration. They build a model where workers search on the job and prefer a permanent contract
over a temporary contract, everything else equal. In their framework ￿rms are willing to upgrade the
contract to reduce the probability that temporary workers quit. G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007) provide
evidence that conversion rates are higher for workers with a higher outside option, which increases
their probability of quitting. Their interpretation is that "as soon as a job match is perceived to be
productive enough, a ￿rm may have a su¢ cient incentive to promote a temporary worker, instead of
keeping him/her in a temporary contract for the entire legal duration " (G￿ell and Petrongolo 2007,
p.160).
5The assumption that all ￿rms prefer to hire a new worker with a temporary contract might seem
restrictive. However, in Spain, which is the most deregulated country in Europe with respect to ￿xed-
term contracts, the fraction of new hires that were signed under temporary contracts in the period
1985-2002 has constantly ranged between 91% and 97% (Guell and Petrongolo 2007).
10the observation of output at the end of the period. The wage of a worker in a match
that is expected to be good with probability ￿ is denoted by !i(￿), for i = T;I and is
the solution of the generalized Nash bargaining criterion for values of ￿ at which the
minimum wage does not bind. The subscripts T and I are used to denote temporary
and permanent contracts respectively. For reasons that will become clearer below, I
is an indicator function equal to zero if the contract is new, and equal to one if the
contract is renegotiated.
4.2 Workers and ￿rms
This section characterizes the steady-state behavior of workers and ￿rms. Both
are risk-neutral.
The ￿rms:
The present discounted value of a vacancy, denoted by V , solves the following
Bellman equation:









where ￿ is the discount factor, and Ji(￿) for i = T;0 denotes the value to the ￿rm of
having a worker matched with signal ￿ employed in a temporary contract or in a new
permanent contract, respectively.
Let b denote the disutility of work, and satisfy b ￿ yb: As long as the value of
search for an unemployed worker is positive, this condition is su¢ cient to ensure that
bad matches are terminated at equilibrium.
The value to the ￿rm of having a worker employed on a temporary contract reads
as follows:
JT(￿) = maxfV;￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ !T(￿) + ￿￿V
+￿(1 ￿ ￿) f￿[￿J0(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ] + (1 ￿ ￿)JT(￿)gg: (2)
The ￿rst three terms represent current period expected pro￿ts. If the match breaks
down, with probability ￿, the ￿rm is left next period with a vacant job, whose present
value is given by the fourth term. The last term represents expected future discounted
pro￿ts if the match does not break down. If the quality of the match is discovered,
the ￿rm upgrades the temporary contract into a permanent one if, with probability
￿; the worker is revealed to be good, and ￿res the worker if, with probability 1 ￿ ￿;
the worker is revealed to be bad: Therefore, the ￿rm gets with probability ￿ the value
of having a worker, who is good with probability one, employed in a new permanent
contract, and with probability 1￿￿ the value of a vacant job. If, on the contrary, the
productivity of the worker is not revealed, the ￿rm keeps the worker in a temporary
position:
Following a standard practice in the literature, it is assumed that dismissal costs
are a pure resource waste, which occurs whenever a job is destroyed. As such, ￿ring
11costs can be considered as equivalent to a separation tax. When deciding whether
to form a permanent match, the ￿rm does not incur dismissal costs if the permanent
match is not formed. Then, dismissal costs are only paid when an ongoing relationship
is severed. The outside option of the ￿rm will therefore be di⁄erent whether the
permanent contract is new or renewed. This asymmetry between new and ongoing
matches implies that the matched ￿rm-worker pair must also be indexed to indicate
whether it is a newly formed match or whether it is a pre-existing match. The indicator
I is then used to indicate a new permanent match when it equals zero, and a pre-
existing permanent match when it equals 1. The value to an entrepreneur of a match
that has received the signal ￿, for new and continuing matches therefore satis￿es:
JI(￿) = maxfV ￿ Id;￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ !I(￿) + ￿￿(V ￿ d)
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f￿[￿J1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(V ￿ d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)J1(￿)gg: (3)
The interpretation of this equation is similar to the previous one, but here the nego-
tiated wage !I(￿) depends on whether the match is new or pre-existing. The wage
function !I(￿) equals the maximum between the minimum wage and the outcome of
the generalized Nash criterion.
The workers:












+ [1 ￿ ￿m(￿)]U
￿
; (4)
where ￿ denotes the probability that the worker is o⁄ered a temporary contract, and
Wi(￿) for i = T;0 denotes the value to the worker of being employed with signal ￿ in
a temporary contract or in a new permanent contract, respectively.
In the standard matching model, both the worker and the ￿rm decide simulta-
neously whether to form a match. With Nash bargaining there is agreement on the
decision of forming the match, and the match is formed as long as the surplus is pos-
itive. The wage then adjusts to split the surplus between the two parties according
to a simple sharing rule. This is no longer the case in this model since the minimum
wage is binding. It might therefore be possible, for some ￿low￿values of ￿; that the
worker would like to form a match, but the ￿rm would not. If a match is formed only
if both parties agree, then the decision of whether to form a match depends only on
the ￿rm, and the worker takes the decision rule of the ￿rm as given.
The value to the worker of a temporary match that received the signal ￿, reads as
follows:
WT(￿) = maxfU;f!T(￿) ￿ b + ￿￿U + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿f￿[￿W0(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)U] + (1 ￿ ￿)WT(￿)ggXT(￿)g; (5)
12where XT(￿) is the ￿rm￿ s decision rule of forming a match, which is equal to 1 whenever
JT(￿) ￿ V , and equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, the value to the worker of a
permanent position in a match that received the signal ￿ is written as follows:
WI(￿) = maxfU;f!I(￿) ￿ b + ￿￿U + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿f￿[￿W1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)U] + (1 ￿ ￿)W1(￿)ggXI(￿)g; (6)
where XI(￿) is the ￿rm￿ s decision rule of forming a match, which is equal to 1 whenever
JI(￿) ￿ V ￿ Id, and equal to zero otherwise.
4.3 Equilibrium
The steady-state measure of temporary matches is denoted by eT, the measure of
permanent matches by eP; the measure of matches known to be of good quality by eg,
the measure of matches of unknown quality by en, the measure of vacancies by v, and
the measure of unemployed workers by u. At the stationary equilibrium job creation
for each type of match must equal job destruction. Denoting by E the expectation
operator, the following equations must therefore hold:
[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]eT = vm(￿)￿E[XT (￿)]; (7)
￿eg = (1 ￿ ￿)￿eTE[￿jXT (￿) = 1] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(eP ￿ eg)E[￿jX0 (￿) = 1]; (8)
￿eg+(1 ￿ ￿)￿(eP ￿ eg)f1 ￿ E[￿jX0 (￿) = 1]g = vm(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)E[X0 (￿)]
+eT(1 ￿ ￿)￿E[￿jXT (￿) = 1]; (9)
en = eT + (eP ￿ eg); (10)
u = 1 ￿ eT ￿ eP: (11)
De￿nition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a list of prices f!T(￿); !I(￿)g; quanti-
ties fv; u; eT; eP; eg; eng; values fV; JT(￿); JI(￿); U; WT(￿); WI(￿)g; and rules
fXT (￿); XI (￿)g; such that the following conditions hold:
1. Value functions: Given !T(￿), !I(￿); u, and v, V , JT(￿); JI(￿), U, WT(￿); and
WI(￿) satisfy the Bellman equations (1) to (6).
2. Temporary match formation: Given !T(￿); !I(￿); u and v, XT (￿) is an optimal
decision rule for the ￿rm.
3. Permanent match formation: Given !I(￿); u and v, XI (￿) is an optimal decision
rule for the ￿rm.
4. Free entry: Given !T(￿) and !I(￿); the ratio ￿ must be such that V = 0.
135. Bargaining on temporary contracts: the wage function must be such that !T(￿) =
max[!
N
T (￿); ￿ !], where the Nash wage function !
N
T (￿) solves
WT(￿) ￿ U = ￿ [JT(￿) + WT(￿) ￿ V ￿ U]; (12)
and ￿ denotes the bargaining power of the workers.
6. Bargaining on permanent contracts: the wage function must be such that !I(￿) =
max[!
N
I (￿); ￿ !], where the Nash wage function !
N
I (￿) solves
WI(￿) ￿ U = ￿ [JI(￿) + WI(￿) ￿ (V ￿ Id) ￿ U]: (13)
7. Steady state: equations (7) to (11) hold.
The permanent match formation rule:
In order to solve for the equilibrium of the model, it is necessary to characterize the
hiring rules for the ￿rm. This implies ￿nding two cuto⁄ values for the signal, denoted
by ￿ ￿T and ￿ ￿0; below which the ￿rms are unwilling to o⁄er temporary contracts and
permanent contracts, respectively. Let SI(￿) = JI(￿) + WI(￿) ￿ (V ￿ Id) ￿ U denote
the surplus functions for permanent contracts. Then S1(￿) ￿ S0(￿) = d: Intuitively,
the surplus is higher for ongoing matches since the existence of dismissal costs lowers
the combined outside option of the two parties. Substituting equations (3) and (6)
together with the free-entry condition V = 0 yields:
SI(￿) = maxf0;￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + (I ￿ ￿)d
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿S1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)S1(￿)]g:
In a non-trivial equilibrium where ￿ ￿0 < 1; the value of S1(1) can be easily obtained
from the above expression, and equals:
S1(1) =
yg ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + (1 ￿ ￿)d
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
At the calibrated equilibrium the minimum wage is binding only for all the new per-
manent contracts; for all the pre-existing permanent contracts and for all temporary
contracts instead, the minimum wage is not binding. I brie￿ y anticipate here the role
played by the minimum wage in this model. Intuitively, with Nash bargaining work-
ers and ￿rms share the costs of employment protection, through an initial transfer of
resources. In calibrated matching models of the labor market with employment protec-
tion, wages in the ￿rst period of the relationship are usually negative. However, in the
real world we do not observe transfers of resources, and wages are never negative. A
minimum wage in this setting simply puts an upper bound on the transfer of resources
that can take place at the beginning of the relationship. The quantitative impact of
the minimum wage and its interactions with the other labor market institutions will
be extensively discussed in Section 5.
14The value to the ￿rm of having a worker employed on a new permanent contract can
therefore be rewritten from eq.(3) substituting the wage function with the minimum
wage, and substituting J1(￿) with (1 ￿ ￿)S1(￿) ￿ d using the Nash sharing rule. The
value function now reads as follows:
J0(￿) = ￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿d + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿f(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿S1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)S1 (￿)] ￿ dg: (14)
Given that J0(￿) is strictly increasing in ￿, setting J0(￿ ￿0) = 0 implicitly de￿nes a
unique threshold value of ￿ ￿0. The permanent match formation equation then reads as
follows:
￿ ￿0yg +(1￿ ￿ ￿0)yb ￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿d+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿ ￿0S1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)S1 (￿ ￿0)] ￿ dg = 0:
(15)
Since the surplus of pre-existing matches is higher than the surplus of new permanent
matches, any given value of ￿ which is found acceptable at the beginning of a permanent
relationship also remains acceptable in future periods. This implies that ￿ ￿0 is the
single cuto⁄ value which is relevant to characterize acceptance decisions in permanent
matches.
The temporary match formation rule:
The match formation equation for temporary contracts can be found using a similar
procedure. As before, it is convenient to de￿ne by ST(￿) = JT(￿) + WT(￿) ￿ V ￿ U
the surplus function for temporary contracts. Plugging equations (2) and (5) into the




￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ [S1(1) ￿ d]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
Since the minimum wage is not binding for temporary contracts at the calibrated
equilibrium, a match will be formed only as long as the surplus is positive, with com-
mon agreement between the parties. Given that ST(￿) is strictly increasing in ￿; the
match formation equation for temporary contracts can therefore be obtained by setting
ST(￿ ￿T) = 0. This equation reads:
￿ ￿Tyg + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿T)yb ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿T [S1(1) ￿ d] = 0: (16)
Free entry and job search:
At the stationary equilibrium, with free entry the value of a vacancy is zero. Sub-










where J0(￿) is given by (14).
15The value of unemployment can also be rearranged as follows, using the free entry
condition, the Nash bargaining rule ￿ST(￿) = WT(￿)￿U and substituting W0(￿)￿U =







ST(￿)dH(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
[S1(￿) ￿ d ￿ J0(￿)]dH(￿)
￿
: (18)
Duly substituting for the surplus equations and for J0(￿), the equations (7) to (11)
together with the equations (15) to (18) constitute a non-linear system of nine equa-
tions in the following nine unknowns: v; u; eT; eP; eg; en; ￿ ￿0; ￿ ￿T and U: This system
can be solved numerically using Newton￿ s method.
The wage equations:
When the system is solved, it is possible to recover the Nash wage equations for
new and pre-existing permanent contracts by substituting (3) and (6) into (13). With
a binding minimum wage for new permanent contracts, the equilibrium wage functions
are !0(￿) = ￿ ! for all ￿ 2 [￿ ￿0;1] and !1(￿) = !
N
1 (￿) for all ￿ 2 [￿ ￿1;1]: Even if ￿ ! is
binding for all new permanent contracts, the Nash wage equation !
N
0 (￿) gives the
shadow wage that would occur if wages were freely contractible, given the surplus at
equilibrium. The Nash wage equations are written:
!
N
I (￿) = b + (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿SI (￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿￿S1 (1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿S1 (￿)]:
Similarly, it is possible to recover the wage equation for temporary contracts by sub-
stituting (2) and (5) into (12). Since the minimum wage does not bind for temporary
contracts, !T(￿) = !
N
T (￿), and the wage equation is written as follows:
!
N
T (￿) = b + (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿ST (￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f￿￿ [W0 (1) ￿ U] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ST (￿)g:
5 Calibration
5.1 Parameter values
The model is calibrated to the Italian labor market in 1996, just before the ￿rst
wave of major reforms of temporary contracts, which took place in 1997. The calibra-
tion strategy assumes that both Italy and the US share the same technology and the
same process of learning about match quality. Alternatively, this assumption implies
that any di⁄erence in the functioning of the two labor markets stems from di⁄erent
labor market institutions, namely ￿ring costs, minimum wages, unemployment bene￿ts
and the degree of liberalizations of temporary contracts. In the special case in which
d = 0, the minimum wage is no longer binding, temporary and permanent contracts
become equivalent, and the equilibrium of this model collapses to the one in the bench-
mark economy of Pries and Rogerson (2005). The calibration strategy therefore allows
me to use several parameter values which were calibrated in their paper to match US
stylized facts.6
6More precisely, in the case of d = 0 and ￿ = 0; a minor di⁄erence with respect to the bechmark
model of Pries and Rogerson (2005) remains. As opposed to their paper, in this model I abstract
16One period of time in the model equals one month in the calibration. Following
Pries and Rogerson (2005), the distribution function for ￿ is obtained from a normal
with zero mean and standard deviation ￿, truncated below zero and above one and re-
scaled to integrate to 1 in the support. The parameter values used for the benchmark
calibration are represented in the following table:
￿ :32 A :4
￿ :13 ￿ :5
yb 1 ￿ :5
yg 1:9 ￿ :0085
b 1 ￿ :278
￿ :9966 d 5:16
c :249 ￿ ! 1:22
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
The parameters ￿ and ￿ are crucial, since they capture the process of learning
about match quality. Their values, ￿ = :32 and ￿ = :13; were calibrated by Pries and
Rogerson (2005) in order to match relevant statistics estimated by Pries (2004) for the
US labor market. Since the results of the calibration are left unchanged if yb, yg, b,
c; ￿ ! and d are all multiplied by a constant value, the value of productivity in the bad
state, yb, can be normalized to one. yg is set to 1.9, as in Pries and Rogerson (2005).
The spread in productivity was backed up to match the percentage spread between
the lowest and the highest wage observed at the equilibrium with estimates by Topel
and Ward (1992) on the wage increases associated with job changes in the US. The
discount factor ￿ is set to match an annual interest rate of 4%.
Following a common practice in the literature, the matching function is assumed
to be Cobb-Douglas, with the explicit functional form M(v;u) = Au￿v1￿￿: Both the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment, and the bargaining
power of the workers are set to .5. These parameters are selected in order to preserve
comparability with Pries and Rogerson (2005) and with most of the literature in this
￿eld. The constant of the matching function is set to .4 also in accordance with Pries
and Rogerson (2005). Yet, as pointed out by Shimer (2005), matching models of the
labor market o⁄er a degree of freedom in the choice of the constant of the matching
function, as there exist in￿nite combinations of that constant with the ￿ ow cost of a
vacancy which leave the equilibrium of the labor market unchanged.
The exogenous job destruction rate ￿ is set to :0085 as in Pries and Rogerson
(2005), implying a yearly job destruction rate of about 10%. As shown by Bertola
and Rogerson (1996), the yearly job destruction rate is about 10% both for Italy - and
more in general for most European countries - and for the US. The value for the cost
from ￿xed costs of opening vacancies since I am not interested in distinguishing between job ￿ ows
and worker ￿ ows. However, this detail is irrelevant for what concerns the calibration. With respect
to the benchmark calibration of Pries and Rogerson (2005), a version of the model without vacancy
￿xed-costs simply requires setting the vacancy ￿ ow cost to .298; all other parameters must remain
unchanged to match the same stylized facts.
17of a vacancy is set to .249, in order to match an unemployment rate of 11.3%, as in
Italy in 1997.
The value for the disutility of the working activity, b, is normalized to 1, implying
that bad matches are severed at equilibrium. It is easy to show that in this setting
an increase in the unemployment bene￿ts, or in the value of leisure is equivalent to an
increase in b (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). If interpreted only as unemployment
compensation, this value for b implies a replacement ratio with respect to the average
wage of about 58%. Selecting an appropriate value for the replacement ratio is often
controversial, since b includes, besides unemployment bene￿ts, also non measurable
entities such as the disutility and the opportunity cost of the working activity. In the
literature, values for the replacement ratio in the US have been used, which range
from 40% (Shimer, 2005) to 98.8% (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2007). Costain and
Reiter (2008) argue that an intermediate value of about 75% is more appropriate and
consistent with the estimated elasticity of the unemployment rate to unemployment
bene￿ts for the OECD countries. As shown by Table 4 in the Appendix, Italy is
characterized by a very low level of unemployment bene￿ts. A somewhat lower value
of 58% for Italy might therefore be appropriate. Moreover, changes in the value of b
show that the normalization in the benchmark parametrization is not essential for the
quantitative conclusions.
The level of ￿ring costs, d, is set to equal three months of the average wage observed
in the equilibrium. Although there are no direct estimates for administrative costs of
dismissal, this value for d is often used to represent an average European country.
Three months is a conservative choice in this framework since the higher the level of
￿ring costs, the stronger the quantitative impact of temporary contracts. The values
for the dismissal cost used in the literature to represent a Mediterranean country range
from six weeks (Nagypal, 2002), to six months (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001), or even
one year and a half (Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
In Italy, a set of minimum wages is determined in sectorial collective arrangements,
and is then extended to all employers who were not parties to the original agreement.
Therefore, as opposed to other countries in Europe, there does not exist a single
minimum wage. Dolado et al. (1996) report values of the Kaitz index for many
OECD countries. This index measures the ratio of the minimum wage to the average
wage, weighted by the fraction of workers covered by the agreements, and it is used in
this calibration to pin down a value for ￿ !. As it is possible to see from Table 4 in the
Appendix, the Kaitz index measured for Italy is higher than for other OECD countries.
Finally, the last parameter to set in the calibration, the value of ￿; is targeted to match
a share of temporary contracts equal to 7.5%, as in Italy, prior to the reforms of 1997.
5.2 Quantitative analysis
The benchmark economy:
I begin this section by judging how well the model in the benchmark parametriza-
tion performs along some important dimensions which are not a direct target of the
18Benchmark Post-Reforms
￿ 0:278 0:744
eT=(eT + eP) 0:075 0:13
￿ ￿T 0:16 0:20
￿ ￿0 0:44 0:51
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿T) 0:62 0:54
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿0) 0:17 0:11
Wage gap 0:21 0:21
Productivity gap 0:27 0:29
Productivity change 0 0:02
Annual worker turnover (%) 50 62
Contact ￿nding rate 0:47 0:60
Unemployment rate 0:113 0:069
Output 1:63 1:70
Output change (%) 0 4:2
Table 2: Simulated results for the labor market reforms in Italy
calibration exercise. A crucial statistic to appraise the performance of the model is
the transition rate from temporary contracts into permanent contracts. The hypothe-
sis that ￿rms use temporary contracts as instruments of churning policies was indeed
criticized for implying excessively low transformation rates. On the other hand, ex-
cessively high transformation rates might shed doubts on the assumption that Europe
and US share the same learning technology.
The model was therefore simulated generating 100 repetitions of 100000 employment-
unemployment paths for a worker starting in a temporary job. It was found that a
temporary worker has a probability of 41:3% to be employed in a permanent contract
one year later.7 The 95% con￿dence interval around the mean ranges from 41% to
41.65%. Calculations reported by the (OECD, 2002), based on the European Commu-
nity Household Panel show that exactly 41.3% of temporary workers in Italy in 1996
had moved into permanent job positions one year later. For most European countries
the same transition probabilities range from about 36% to 56%, with only two notable
exceptions: Spain, 23:1% and France, 20:8%: Such a low degree of upward mobility in
these two countries looks like an exception in the European scenario and suggests that
alternative forces leading to market segmentations could be dominant.
The contact ￿nding rate for a worker in the model economy is .47 per month.
This value is close to the monthly job ￿nding rate of .48 measured by Hall (2005) for
the US. However, in this framework, the job ￿nding rate does not depend uniquely
on the contact ￿nding rate, but also on the average probability of passing the hiring
test. At the calibrated equilibrium, the acceptance rates for temporary and permanent
positions is .62 and .17, respectively. As expected, the absence of dismissal costs for
temporary contracts increases the willingness of the ￿rms to experiment new workers,
lowering the threshold value of expected productivity required for hiring. The job
7See footnote 2.
19￿nding rate is .14 at equilibrium, implying an average unemployment duration of 7.3
months.
Since hiring practices are less selective for workers employed on temporary posi-
tions, temporary workers are on average less productive than permanent workers, and
earn lower wages. The wage gap implied by the calibration is about 21%, and re￿ ects
a productivity gap of about 27%. The OECD (2002) reports that in 1997 the wage
penalty for temporary workers in Italy was about 28%. Controlling for worker and
job characteristics, the wage penalty decreases to 13% in Italy, and is ranging between
6% and 24% in Europe, with an average value of 15%. The wage gap implied by the
model seems somewhat larger than in the data.
The performance of the model is also consistent with evidence on the dynamic
relative wage pro￿le for temporary and permanent workers. Having assumed that
heterogeneity is only match speci￿c implies that any temporary worker will sooner or
later be employed in a high productivity permanent match. Consequently, temporary
workers are expected to catch up completely with the wages earned by workers on
permanent positions. This is consistent with the results of Booth et al. (2002) in a
study on the British labor market. They ￿nd that the wage gap between workers who
start working on temporary and permanent contracts substantially tapers o⁄with full-
time work experience. In particular, women who start in ￿xed-term employment and
move to permanent jobs are found to fully catch up to those who start in permanent
jobs.
Following the standard practice, I compute the gross annual worker turnover rate
by multiplying the monthly turnover rate by 12. The monthly turnover rate is in turn
computed as the sum of employment entry and exit rates, where a transition from a
temporary to a permanent position is recorded as a simultaneous entry and exit. The
gross annual worker turnover rate implied by the model is about 50 percent. In the
data, Contini (2006) ￿nd a turnover rate of about 62 percent in Italy, for the period
1986-1999. If transitions from temporary to permanent contracts are not recorded, the
turnover rate implied by the model is about 42 percent. Accounting for these types of
transitions can therefore improve the ￿t of the model, which is able overall to capture
a large fraction of the measured turnover rate.
Comparative statics:
I now turn to evaluate how well the model is able to replicate the performance
of the Italian labor market in the last decade following the reforms of temporary
contracts. As it is possible to see from Figure 1 in the Appendix, the unemployment
rate decreased, in these ten years, from 11.3% in 1996 to 6.8% in 2006, while the
share of temporary contracts increased over the same period from 7.5% to 13%. A
simple exercise of comparative statics is then performed, in which the strictness of the
regulation on temporary contracts is reduced in order to match a share of 13% in the
total stock of contracts. The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2.
The exercise is particularly successful at reproducing the pattern of the unemploy-
ment rate in Italy, which decreases to 6:9% following the reforms. The intuition for the
20decrease in unemployment is straightforward. When the share of temporary contracts
in the economy is increased, screening workers on the job is less costly, on average,
and more ￿rms enter the market. A higher entry of ￿rms together with a higher ex-
perimentation of workers in temporary contracts both contribute to increase the rate
of exit from unemployment. In turn, this decreases both the rate and the duration of
unemployment.
The exercise also predicts an increase in productivity of about 2%. The intuition
is as follows. An increase in the share of temporary contracts generates two opposite
e⁄ects on productivity. Since temporary workers are less productive than permanent
workers, increasing their share will tend to decrease average productivity. However, as
the expected cost of screening workers on the job decreases with the share of temporary
workers, labor market tightness increases, and the combined outside option of workers
and ￿rms increases. In turn, this reduces the surplus of a match and translates into
a higher threshold value of expected productivity required to form both temporary
and permanent matches. This e⁄ect, which leads to lower acceptance rates and higher
productivity, is found to dominate at the calibrated equilibrium, and proves robust to
changes in the value of dismissal costs.
Given that total employment also increases at equilibrium, welfare, measured as
total output in the economy, increases by 4:2%. If we consider the lifetime discounted
value of search as an alternative measure of welfare, then welfare raises by 7:7%.
This increase is due to lower unemployment duration, which in turn is triggered by
higher contact rates, and by higher chances to pass the hiring test. Overall, the
calibration clearly suggests that welfare gains derived from using temporary contracts
as a screening device might be large, depending on ￿ring restrictions on permanent
positions and on the length of probationary periods. Given the process of learning
about match quality estimated by Pries (2004), it takes more than seven months,
on average, to discover the productivity of a worker. The probability that the true
productivity of a match is still unknown after three months is about 66%, and after
six months about 43%. Without access to temporary contracts, trial periods of three
months, or six months, which are common across European countries, might therefore
be too short to allow for an e¢ cient reallocation of workers across existing jobs.
By generating a higher experimentation of workers in the economy, temporary
contracts lead to a higher turnover rate, which is close to 62% in the calibration.
The reason is that a higher share of temporary contracts increases both rejections
of bad matches, and transformations into permanent employment. Finally, while the
productivity gap increases by about 2%, the wage gap is not substantially a⁄ected by
the reforms. The elasticity of the wage gap with respect to the productivity gap is
only 5% at the calibrated equilibrium. The intuition is that the ￿rm-worker pair in a
temporary match has an option value on a permanent relationship which is exerted if
the match turns out to be good. An increase in the productivity of permanent workers,
raising the surplus of a permanent match, will then translate into an increase of the






eT=(eT + eP) :075 :13
￿ ￿T 0:12 0:14
￿ ￿0 0:24 0:26
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿T) 0:71 0:67
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿0) 0:45 0:41
Wage gap (%) 0:15 0:16
Productivity gap 30:0 30:5
Productivity change 0 0
Annual worker turnover (%) 56:6 64:9
Contact ￿nding rate 0:29 0:30
Unemployment rate :113 :104
Output 1:61 1:62
Output change (%) 0 0:6
Table 3: Simulated results for a ￿ exible wage economy
The interactions of temporary contracts, dismissal costs, and the minimum wage:
The results indicate that so long as temporary contracts are used as a screening
device, their introduction in an economy with both ￿ring costs and a minimum wage
can have strong implications in terms of unemployment, productivity and welfare. In
order to disentangle how dismissal costs and the minimum wage interact with each
other, and how the two together in turn interact with temporary contracts, I calibrate,
following the same procedure outlined above, a version of the economy with ￿ exible
wages. Next, I perform the same exercise of comparative statics in order to assess
how much the minimum wage matters when temporary contracts are introduced in an
economy with dismissal costs. The results are reported in Table 3.
If ￿ exible wages are introduced in an economy otherwise identical to the one in the
benchmark parametrization, the unemployment rate drops to 6.7%. It is therefore clear
that the interaction of dismissal costs with the minimum wage has a strong negative
e⁄ect on job creation. The intuition is simple: with Nash bargaining, wages in the ￿rst
period adjust in order to equally split the burden of future ￿ring costs between the
parties. If such a transfer of resources from the worker to the ￿rm is prevented, the
negative impact of ￿ring costs on expected pro￿ts is larger, and thus entry is lower.
In order to match an initial unemployment rate of 11.3% in the model with ￿ exible
wages, the vacancy cost must then be increased to 1. Furthermore, ￿ must be set to
0.393 to match a share of temporary contracts of 7.5% when all the other parameter
values are left unchanged with respect to Table 1.
The strong increase in the vacancy posting cost with respect to the benchmark
calibration implies a lower contact ￿nding rate. Given that with a low contact rate the
combined outside option of both workers and ￿rms is lower, the threshold values for ￿ ￿T
22and ￿ ￿0 are also lower, implying higher acceptance rates. When the share of temporary
contracts is increased to 13%, the impact on productivity is negligible, output increases
by only 0.6%, and the unemployment rate decreases by only 1%. With respect to the
benchmark calibration, an economy with ￿ exible wages can barely reproduce one ￿fth
of the drop in the unemployment rate. The interaction between ￿ring costs and the
minimum wage is therefore crucial to account for the behavior of the Italian labor
market following the reforms. In general, it seems that if temporary contracts are used
as a screening device, labor market reforms enhancing ￿ exibility at the margin can
reverse most of the negative e⁄ects associated with employment protection, and with
its interaction with the minimum wage.
In the case in which d = 0, the minimum wage is not binding and does not a⁄ect
the equilibrium of the labor market. As ￿ring costs increase, the wage bargained in the
￿rst period of a permanent relationship decreases, and the minimum wage eventually
becomes binding. Therefore, in the model economy, minimum wages have no direct
e⁄ect on the equilibrium, but only an indirect e⁄ect through the interaction with
dismissal costs. Minimum wages a⁄ect the economy to the extent that they set an
upper bound on the transfer of resources that can take place in the ￿rst period of
a relationship. The higher the minimum wage, the stronger the impact of temporary
contracts. However, reasonable changes in the minimum wage with respect to the value
set in the benchmark calibration do not substantially a⁄ect the quantitative result.
6 Discussion
Numerical solutions of the model show that the e⁄ects produced by the introduc-
tion of temporary contracts hinge on labor market institutions. If screening workers
for permanent positions is the main reason why ￿rms use these types of contracts,
liberalizing their use increases productivity and welfare and decreases the unemploy-
ment rate so long as ￿ring workers with permanent contracts is costly. In general,
the higher the dismissal costs, the higher the bene￿ts associated with a reduction of
employment protection at the margin. Moreover, the existence of a minimum wage
strongly magni￿es the negative e⁄ects associated with employment protection. Since
the introduction of temporary contracts can reverse most of these e⁄ects, their impact
on the economy will therefore be stronger in connection with a strong minimum wage
legislation.
These results were also obtained under the assumption that ￿ring costs are a pure
resource waste. This is probably the most conventional way of modeling ￿ring costs,
although it is not unique. Alternatively, dismissal costs can be modeled as severance
payments. In this case ￿ring costs are simply a transfer of resources from the ￿rm to
the employee in case of dismissal. It is well-known that with ￿ exible wages, severance
payments have no impact on the labor market equilibrium since a transfer of resources
conditional on a separation does not a⁄ect the size of the surplus. With ￿ exible wages
and severance payments, wages in the ￿rst period of a relationship adjust in order
to fully compensate ￿rms for future expected dismissal costs, without altering their
incentives to enter the market. Yet, in the presence of a minimum wage, this transfer
23cannot take place, entailing a negative e⁄ect on job creation. The choice of modeling
￿ring costs as a pure waste of resources is therefore not essential for the results.
It was noted that in the case in which d = 0, temporary contracts have no impact
on the labor market equilibrium. Obviously, if there are no ￿ring costs on permanent
positions, temporary contracts and permanent contracts are equivalent in this setting,
and there are no gains that can be obtained through screening workers for permanent
positions. Thus, in an economy with no ￿ring restrictions, such as the US, there is
no reason why ￿rms should resort to temporary contracts to screen workers. This
can explain why temporary contracts are found to be a port of entry into regular
employment in Europe, but not in the US.
A common result in the literature on temporary contracts is that enhancing ￿ exi-
bility at the margin is a second best solution, the ￿rst best being a reduction in ￿ring
costs. This holds true also in this framework, as long as some waste of resources is
associated with ￿ring permanent workers. Even in the case of ￿ = 1; when only good
workers are hired for permanent positions, the exogenous source of job destruction is
still costly for the matched worker-￿rm pair, and is therefore a source of welfare drain.
The mechanism highlighted in this paper reverses some of the conclusions obtained
through the standard models of temporary contracts, helping to reconcile the theory
with the empirical evidence. However, the main policy implications remain in line
with the common opinion expressed in the current debate. It cannot be excluded that
some part of the workforce, of debatable magnitude, might be harmed by the intro-
duction of temporary contracts, and remain trapped in recurring spells of temporary
employment and unemployment. Several economists have therefore proposed replac-
ing various chategories of temporary contracts with a unique permanent contract with
extended probation. This view could be shared also in the light of this paper, as all the
gains that arise through temporary contracts could likewise be generated by extended
probationary periods on permanent positions.
7 Conclusions
A growing body of empirical evidence has recently documented that in most Eu-
ropean countries, temporary contracts play a fundamental role in the labor market as
a screening device. For the case of Portugal, Varejao and Portugal (2003) show that
screening workers for permanent positions is the single most important reason why
￿rms use these types of contracts. This paper presents a framework which embeds
the screening hypothesis into an equilibrium model of the labor market. The aim is
to understand how temporary contracts interact with other labor market institutions,
and how they a⁄ect the labor market equilibrium and welfare.
The model can account for the relatively high mobility rates into permanent em-
ployment measured for most European countries, and for the recent empirical ￿ndings
indicating that temporary contracts correlate positively with employment at the Eu-
ropean level. These results are important since models assuming that ￿rms use tem-
porary contracts as instruments of churning policies have opposite predictions. Models
24which assume that ￿rms use temporary contracts as bu⁄er stocks are instead incon-
clusive on the long-run e⁄ects on employment and unemployment, and are unsuited
to study the transition rates.
The paper also shows that when temporary contracts are used as a screening device,
they can substantially increase both productivity and welfare. Temporary contracts
can thus reverse most of the negative e⁄ects associated with employment protection,
and with its interactions with the minimum wage. The calibration of the model can
account for salient statistics of the Italian labor market, including the transition prob-
abilities, the worker turnover rate, the wage gap between temporary and permanent
workers and the drop of the unemployment rate, following the reforms.
The model presented in this paper isolates a single mechanism through which tem-
porary contracts generate welfare gains. However, this story captures only a part of
the whole picture. On the other hand, it is found that ￿rms o⁄er less training to
temporary workers. By a⁄ecting the expected duration of a relationship, temporary
contracts might presumably also in￿ uence workers￿investment in ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital. It is possible that in European labor markets, where systems of payment based
on performance are scarce, employment protection provides an alternative incentive to
exert e⁄ort, and invest in ￿rm-speci￿c human capital. Investigating how reductions of
employment protection a⁄ect the pattern of human capital accumulation, is beyond the
scope of this paper, and remains an important question to explore in future research.






















Unemployment Rate Share of Temporary Contracts
Figure 1: Share of Temporary Contracts and Unemployment Rate in Italy. 1996-2007
Country EPL Strictness Kaitz index Replacement ratio
United States 0.7 .39 .50
United Kingdom 0.9 .40 .38
Denmark 1.5 .54 .90
Finland 2.1 .52 .63
Sweden 2.6 .52 .80
Germany 2.6 .55 .63
France 2.8 .50 .57
Spain 3.1 .32 .70
Italy 3.4 .71 .20
Portugal 3.7 .45 .65
Table 4: Sources: OECD (1999,table 2.5, pp.62) and Dolado et al. (1996)
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